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DID THE U.S. SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZE AN ELUSIVE OR
ILLUSIVE JUDICIAL TAKING IN STOP THE BEACH
RENOURISHMENT?
DEREK LESLIE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The storm left its mark on the area. Houses were flattened.' Local
business, with their windows shattered and their property in ruins, had been
hammered by the powerful winds and torrential downpour.2 The local
church lost its roof and the beaches had washed out to sea. Trees had fallen
and other debris was littered everywhere.4  Gale-force winds and strong
waves had pushed the sand inland, giving everything a gritty, dirty texture.5
For residents lucky enough to still have their homes, water and power
would take days to restore.6
Such was the scene as residents returned to what remained of their
homes along Florida's Gulf Coast after Hurricane Opal tore through the
area in 1995.7 The storm ravaged homes, resorts, condominiums, and small
businesses of local residents, turning their lives upside-down. The storm
killed fifteen people in four states and caused billions in property damage,
yet for the Florida Gulf Coast, hurricanes like Opal are not unheard of and
are actually an expected part of everyday life for the typical Floridian.9
For beachfront residents in particular, the multitude of hurricanes
represents a variety of dangers, some of which are only now becoming fully
apparent. Beachfront landowners are extremely vulnerable to the
devastating effects of hurricanes, becoming the first and most likely targets
. Staff Member, Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture, & Natural Resources Law, 2009-
2011. B.A. Political Science & B.A. English Literature/Folklore 2008, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, J.D. May 2011, University of Kentucky College of Law.
' Rene Sanchez, Opal Kills 15 in Assault on South, Wash. Post, Oct. 6, 1995, at Al.
2 id.
3id.4 id.
6id
7Sanchez, supra note 1.
8 Id.
9 d
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as storms make landfall with blistering winds and strong waves. The
pelting not only affects homes and man-made property, the images that
make the news the next day, but the storms also greatly damage the
beaches, eroding the coastline and potentially whittling away the beachfront
landowners' real property.
In Stop the Beach Renourishment ("Beach Renourishment"), the
Florida Department of Environmental Protection ("FDEP") issued permits
to the city of Destin and Walton County to repair the damage erosion had
caused on their beaches.'o Beachfront landowners formed "Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc.", a non-profit corporation through which the
landowners sued to stop this action." The Florida District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded the FDEP's decision,12 and also certified a question
to the Florida Supreme Court, asking it to consider whether the Beach and
Shore Preservation Act, the Florida statute upon which the agency action
relied, unconstitutionally deprived property owners of their littoral rights
without just compensation.13 The Florida Supreme Court answered the
certified question in the negative, quashed the remand, and denied a
rehearing.14 After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
found that the lower court's action did not constitute an unconstitutional
taking of the beachfront landowners' property rights.' 5 In doing so, the
Court upheld the FDEP's permit grant and allowed the restoration of the
eroded beaches.16
This Note will explore the significance of the U.S. Supreme Court's
recognition of the possibility of a judicial taking and its effect on
environmental land disputes. Section II will examine the necessary legal
background. Section III will detail the relevant facts and procedural history
of Beach Renourishment. Next, Section IV will analyze Justice Scalia's
plurality opinion and the various concurrences. Finally, Section V will
attempt to synthesize the disparate views of the members of the Supreme
Court and draw conclusions regarding the direction of the Court's Takings
Clause jurisprudence.
'0 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep'i of EnvtL Prot. et al., 130 S.Ct. 2592,
2600 (2010).
" Id.
2 id.
1 Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 2008).
14 Id. at 1102, 1105.
15 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2613.
'6 Id at 2595.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. State Property Law
Generally, state law defines property interests, and these interests
can take various forms." In Florida, the State owns any land permanently
submerged beneath navigable waters as well as any land up to the mean
high-water line.' 8 This land is held in trust by the state for the public as a
whole.19 In contrast, land above the mean high-water line may be privately
owned.20  This privately owned beachfront land is known as littoral21
property, which comes with certain attendant rights. Littoral property
owners, by virtue of their connection with the water, enjoy rights similar to
easements.22 These rights include "the right of access to the water, the right
to use the water for certain purposes, the right to an unobstructed view of
the water, and the right to receive accretions and relictions to the littoral
property." 23
Central to Beach Renourishment are the rights to receive accretions
and relictions. 24 Under Florida law, littoral property owners have the right
to any dry land added gradually and imperceptibly to their existing
property, i.e. dry land added by accretion.25 These changes are gradual and
are only noticeable over extended periods of time.26  This is in marked
contrast to avulsions, which are "sudden or perceptible loss[es] of or
addition[s] to land by the action of the water or a sudden change in the bed
of a lake or the course of a stream."27 In Florida, as at common law, land
created by avulsion retains its character as it was submerged. 28 Thus, in the
case of avulsion, the State retains ownership of the newly dry land.29
" Id. at 2597.
" Id. at 2597-98.
9 Id.; See Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 829-30 (Fla. 1909).
20 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2598.
21 Id.. at 2598. The Court adopted the terminology used by the Florida Supreme Court,
distinguishing "riparian" and "littoral," where "riparian" means abutting any body of water and "littoral"
means abutting an ocean, sea, or lake. See id., FN 1, p. 2598.
22 See Broward, 50 So. at 830; See also Thiesen v. Gulf Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co., 78 So. 491, 507
(Fla. 1918).
23 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2598.
24 Id. Accretions will be used in this Note to generally refer to accretions and relictions. The
difference in terms is minor: accretions are additions of alluvion, i.e., sand, sediment, or other deposits,
to waterfront land. Relictions, on the other hand, are lands that were once submerged by water that have
become dry because the water has receded. Id.
25 id.
26 Id. (citing Bd. OfTr. ofInternal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assoc., Ltd., 512 So.
2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987)).27 Sand Key Assoc., Ltd., 512 So. 2d at 936.
28 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2598-99.
29 id
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The permit central to Beach Renourishment was issued pursuant to
the Beach and Shore Preservation Act ("BSPA").30 The Florida legislature
passed the BSPA in 1961 to establish procedures to restore and preserve the
condition of beaches eroded by the elements. Specifically, the BSPA
provides for beach restoration and nourishment projects.32 Through these
projects, the State may deposit sand on eroded beaches and attempt to
maintain the deposited sand.33 Procedurally, local governments apply to the
FDEP for the money required for a project as well as the necessary permits
for restoration.34  Pursuant to the statute, the Board of Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund must approve such projects when they
require placing fill on the state's submerged lands.35 The Fund holds title to
these lands.
Once these hurdles are overcome, the project may begin. First, the
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund must establish
an "erosion control line."37 This line, set in reference to the existing mean
high-water line, replaces the fluctuating mean high-water line as that which
demarcates between the privately owned beach and the submerged state
property.38 By fixing where the line is drawn, the littoral property owners'
right to future accretions is effectively cut off.3 9
B. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution reads, "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." 40 The prototypical Takings Clause situation is
that of eminent domain, where a governmental objective requires the use of
a private individual's land; then, for the government to seize the property in
question, it must pay the private owner just compensation for his or her
property interest.4 1 This presents an important limit on the government's
power. The Fourteenth Amendment ensures that the rights secured in the
o Id. at 2599-600.
' Id. at 2599. (citing Beach and Shore Preservation Act, Fla. Stat. §§161.011-161.45 (2007)).
32 id.
33 id.
34 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2599.
3 Id.
36 id.
3 7 id.
38 id.
40 U.S. Const. amend. V.
41 See generally US. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-262 (1946) (a couple sought just
compensation from the U.S. for the alleged taking of their property through the operation of a municipal
airport next to their home and chicken farm); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1871)
(Takings Clause suit for just compensation after the state of Wisconsin approved the construction of a
dam which ultimately caused the river to overflow onto the Plaintiffs private property) .
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Bill of Rights, including those found in the Takings Clause, also apply to
state action. 42
The Takings Clause, however, is not limited to the eminent domain
situation. Courts have also been amenable to a broader view of
governmental takings.43 The Takings Clause is equally implicated by the
taking of other property rights, not merely the taking of an estate in land."
Courts have also recognized a taking of private property when the
government has used its own property in such a way that destroyed the
prior use of the private property.45
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the existence of
regulatory takings.46  In these circumstances, a taking occurs where state
regulations force a property owner to submit to a permanent physical
occupation, as in the case of roof cables.47 A regulatory taking could also
occur where state regulation deprives a private property owner of all
economically beneficial use of his or her property.48  Likewise, a
governmental taking may occur where the government re-characterizes land
that had been private property as public property.4 9
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2003, the city of Destin and Walton County submitted an
application for the permits required under the BSPA to restore almost seven
miles of eroded beach.50  The plan required dredging sand from off the
coast and depositing it along the beach, adding about seventy-five feet of
dry sand beyond the mean high-water line.51  In response to the
applications, the FDEP issued a notice of intent to award the permits.52
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., ("Petitioner") a nonprofit corporation
formed by beachfront property owners potentially affected by the plan,
42 Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1897).
43 See Causby, 328 U.S. at 261-62; Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497, 504 (1870).
" E.g. Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497, 504 (1870) (the U.S. Supreme Court finding a state
taking of the rights of a licensee to private property).
45 E.g. Causby, 328 U.S. at 261-62.
46 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537-38 (2005) (stating that the Court's prior
cases each sought to "identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in
which in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain).
47 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (holding that
"a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public
interests that it may serve).
48 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1992).
49 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-65 (1980) (holding that
"a State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation,
even for the limited duration of the deposit in court).
so Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2600.
51 id.
52 id.
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brought an administrative challenge to the proposed permits. 53  This
challenge failed, and the FDEP approved the permits.5 4 Petitioner then
challenged the award of the permits in state court pursuant to the Florida
Administrative Procedure Act." The District Court of Appeal for the First
District sided with Petitioner, finding that the permits had eliminated two of
the members' littoral rights.56 The court found that the members' rights to
receive accretions to their property and to have their property touch the
water were both eliminated." The court therefore held that this plan was an
58unconstitutional taking of private property. Setting aside the FDEP's final
order approving the permits, the court of appeal remanded the action for a
showing that the local governments owned a property interest in the
beachfront property.59 The court also certified a question to the Florida
Supreme Court, asking if "on its face, does the Beach and Shore
Preservation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral rights
without just compensation?"60
The Florida Supreme Court, reading the question as a state
constitutional issue, was not swayed by the lower court's analysis. 6 1 In
finding for the FDEP, the Florida Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of
avulsion, as well as general real property principles.62 This court found that
the littoral property owners' rights were not infringed.63 Instead, the court
characterized their interest in accretions as a contingent interest rather than
a vested property right.64 Moreover, the court concluded that no right of
contact with the water existed, but, instead, littoral property owners
possessed merely a right of access to the water.65 This right, the court
found, would be unaffected by the state action.66 Relying on these
conclusions, the Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in
the negative and quashed the lower court's remand.67 Petitioner sought a
rehearing, suggesting that the court's decision itself represented a taking of
the members' littoral rights contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth
53 
id.
55 Id.
56 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2600.
63Id
5 Id.
5 Id
60 Id.
61 Id at 2600, n.3.
62 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2600.
63 id.
65id
66 id
67 Id at 2600.
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Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.6' The request was denied and the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.69
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari despite the fact that the
state court did not address the issue that was first presented to it in a
petition for rehearing. Although unusual, review is not barred (and may be
warranted) where the state court decision itself is claimed to be a violation
of federal law. 70
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Justice Scalia's Plurality Opinion
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court in Beach
Renourishment.71 All eight Justices agreed that in this case the Florida
Supreme Court's action did not constitute a judicial taking.72 In parts II and
III of his opinion, Justice Scalia, along with three other Justices, recognized
the possibility of judicial taking under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.73 Justice Scalia's opinion focused on
the Takings Clause's emphasis on the "taking" act, rather than on a specific
governmental actor.74 Relying on his textualist approach, he noted that the
language of the Clause failed to say that the existence or scope of a state's
power to take private property differed depending on the branch of
government exerting the power.75 Indeed, he suggested that the notion
76would offend common sense. From this analysis, Justice Scalia
concluded that takings affected by the judicial branch should be treated just
like any other governmental taking. The Justice pointed to the PruneYard
Shopping Center78 and Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies79 cases as precedent
for this view.
In PruneYard, the California Supreme Court overruled its prior
precedent, which had not required private property owners to permit others
to exercise their freedoms of speech, press, and petition as guaranteed by
the California State Constitution on such private property.o In the case,
68 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2600.
69 id.
7o Id. at 2601 n.4, (citing Adams v. Robertson, 520 U.S. 83, 89 n.3 (1997); Brinkerhoff-Faris
Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 677-78 (1930)).
7' Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct.,at 2597.
72 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
" Id. at 2601- 2610.
74 Id. at 2601.
76 id
77 id
78 PruneYardShopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
79 Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 163-65.
so PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 79-80.
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shopping center owners argued that their preexisting property rights could
not be "denied by invocation of a state constitutional provision or by
judicial reconstruction of a State's laws of private property."" The U.S.
Supreme Court, using the prototypical Takings Clause analysis, held that
there had been no taking.8 2 The opinion focused on the alleged taking by
the state constitutional provision, but Justice Scalia quickly suggested that
this was irrelevant and that the same Takings Clause analysis should be
applied when analyzing alleged takings by the judiciary's interference with
an established property right .
Justice Scalia also pointed to Webb 's Fabulous Pharmacies as
precedent for the idea that judicial takings should be treated the same as
more traditional takings.84 In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, the Florida
Supreme Court interpreted a state statute to suggest that the interest on an
account established in an interpleader action should go to the county as
"public money."85  The U.S. Supreme Court held that the interest on an
interpleaded fund should be allocated to the ultimate owner of the principal
that had been taken either by the relevant state statute or the state court's
decision.8 6 The Court concluded that neither the state legislature via statute
nor the courts via decision could re-characterize the property as public
without it constituting a taking within the meaning of the Takings Clause.87
After reviewing the text of the Takings Clause and the Court's prior
precedent in this area, Justice Scalia concluded that the Takings Clause
barred any state actor from taking private property without just
compensation, with only the caveat that the character of the state action
may be relevant.
It is a matter of routine that courts regularly affect private owners'
property rights while fulfilling their constitutional mandates. The difficulty
then, as Justices Kennedy and Breyer cautioned in their opinions, is drafting
a suitable test for determining when a court has affected a judicial taking
without just compensation. The Plaintiff in Beach Renourishment argued in
favor of a "predictability of change" test. 89 Using this test, a judicial taking
occurs when a court's decision reflects a sudden change in state law, one
that is unpredictable from the relevant precedent.90 Justice Scalia found this
test wanting, suggesting that it would "cover both too much and too
8 Id.at 79.
82 Id. at 82-84.
83 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2602.
8 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.; Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 162.
* Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2602; Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S.. at 164.
8 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. 2602. Scalia concedes that while some actions may
always be a taking, others may depend on its nature and extent. Id.
' Id. at 2610.
9o Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner 17, 34-50).
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little."9' He believed the test to be over-inclusive when it would attack an
unpredictable decision, but did nothing to change the status of private
property as it exists under established law.92 On the other hand, Justice
Scalia also found the test to be under-inclusive in that it would not find a
taking where prior precedent had foreshadowed the judicial elimination of
an established private property right.93
Rejecting Plaintiffs "predictability of change" test, Justice Scalia
instead advocated for an "established property right" test.94 Here, a court
would consider whether the allegedly taken property right was
established.95 This approach requires the private property owner first show
that he or she has an established property right.96 In this case, it would be
necessary for Plaintiff to show that the littoral-property owners had "rights
to future accretions and contact with the water superior to the State's right
to fill in its submerged land."97 Second, Plaintiff would have to establish
that the lower court's decision abolished these rights, or in other words,
"took" these rights from the littoral owners.98  Using his proposed
"established property right" test, Justice Scalia found that Plaintiff could
not show that the owners held an established property interest superior to
that of the state and thus were unable to meet the first part of this two-prong
test.99
Justice Scalia's opinion relied on two Florida property law
principles.100 First, Florida property law permits the state, as the owner of
submerged land, to fill that land as long as it does not interfere with the
rights of either the public or the littoral property owners.' 0 Second, state
property law principles dictate that accretions that add to previous avulsions
add to state property rather than to private property.'02  This follows
logically from the principles of avulsions and accretions because avulsions
cut off a private owner's right to accretions. Justice Scalia found that state
law also supported this result.103 In particular, Justice Scalia relied upon
Martin v. Busch.'0 In that case, the state drained water from a state-owned
91 Id.
92 id.
94 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2608-11.
9s Id. at 2610.
96 Id.
9 Id. at 2611.
98 Id.
99 Id.
1oo Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2611.
'0 Id. (citing Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 799-800 (Fla. 1957); Buford v. Tampa, 102
So. 336, 341 (Fla. 1924)).
102 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2611.
103 Id; See Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535 (Fla. 1927).
104 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2611.
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lakebed, causing the lakebed to become dry land. 0 5 The Florida Supreme
Court found that this land, obviously below the original mean high-water
line, continued to belong to the State after becoming dry land.106 Hence,
the case suggested, as Justice Scalia pointed out that Florida law allows the
state to fill in its own seabed and treats the act as an avulsion.107 For Justice
Scalia, this meant that the littoral property owners' right to accretions was
subordinate to the states' right to fill. 08 This is consistent with the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in the case, where the court concluded that the
littoral rights were not implicated by the project because of existing state
property law principles.' 09
Using this analysis, Justice Scalia held in Part V of his opinion that
no judicial taking occurred when the Florida Supreme Court found in favor
of the State in granting the beach restoration permits. 0
B. Justices Breyer and Kennedy's Concurrences
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Sotomayor concurred in
part and concurred in the judgment of the Court."' These four Justices
found that the case could be resolved without reaching the Takings Clause
issue.1 12  In Justice Breyer's and Justice Kennedy's concurrences, both
expressed concerns over the difficulties and consequences of recognizing
the existence of judicial taking.11 3  Moreover, Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, joined by Justice Sotomayor, suggested that substantive due
process would be a more natural and better alternative for these cases than
the path sought by the plurality opinion.114
First, Justices Breyer and Kennedy argued that it was not necessary
for the Court to reach the constitutional issue in Beach Renourishment.1
Regarding complex constitutional questions, Justice Breyer pointed to the
tradition of the Court in limiting its decisions to "only what is necessary to
the disposition of the immediate case."ll 6 In a cautious tone, Justice Breyer
warned that the Court should decide only that the Florida Supreme Court
15 Id.
07 Id.
1o9 Id
110 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2613.
' Id. at 2592.
112 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2613 (Kennedy J., concurring).
" Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 2618 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
114 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
115 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2613 (Kennedy, J. concurring), 2618 (Breyer, J.
concurring).
116 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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decision did not amount to a judicial taking.'17 Chastising the approach of
the plurality, Justice Breyer would avoid recognizing the definite existence
of a judicial taking and would simply suggest that even assuming such
takings could occur, the standard - whatever it may be - was not satisfied
in this case.' 18  Justice Kennedy's concurrence echoed Justice Breyer's
concerns, indicating that it was unwise for the Court to contemplate issues
not considered at length by other courts and commentators.1 19
Justices Breyer and Kennedy also expressed several practical
concerns. Justice Breyer was particularly worried about federal courts
having to address Takings Clause issues in cases involving complex state
law questions. 120 Foreseeing potentially large-scale federal interference in
state matters, Justice Breyer advocated for a more deliberate consideration
of the consequences of recognizing a judicial taking. 12 1 In his concurrence,
Justice Kennedy disclosed fears that a judicial takings doctrine might grant
too much power to the judiciary.122 In his view, such a doctrine could
provide a judge with too much discretion in awarding changes in beneficial
property rights. 123  Moreover, Justice Kennedy was troubled by how a
judicial takings claim would be properly raised. Namely, his concern was
that the takings issue would not be litigated in the action that created the
substance of the judicial takings claim.124  The question then becomes
whether the plaintiff must bring a second action arguing that the first
constituted a judicial taking by its change in property law. 125 This collateral
action would seem to offend the doctrine of res judicata, but would pass
scrutiny because the judicial takings issue would not arise until after such a
taking took place.126
Justice Kennedy's other practical concern was the appropriate
remedy.127  In his view, precedent from prior Takings Clause cases
suggested that the Court was only entitled to award damages, but not
equitable relief.'28  In prior cases, the Court held that a suit for
compensation was the only appropriate remedy for Takings Clause cases.129
Justice Kennedy attributed this rule to the language of the Clause itself.
Since the Clause does not prohibit the state from taking private property
11s Id.
18Id.
119 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2617-18 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
1M Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2618-19 (Breyer, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 2619.
122 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
123 id
124 Id. at 2616-17.
125 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2617.
126 id
127 Id. at 2617.
128 Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984)).
129 130 S.Ct. at 2617 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los
Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 321-22 (1987)).
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from individuals, but merely the taking of such property without just
compensation, the most logical remedy for Takings Clause claims is
awarding just compensation.130  Dovetailing this premise with the
possibility of a less restrained judiciary, courts willing to find judicial
takings could feel reassured that their decisions rearranging property rights
would merely require compensating the affected party. 131  For Justice
Kennedy, this kind of power was too much, preferring instead to leave it
vested in the other branches because they are subject to political control
with accompanying checks on abuses of such powers. 132
Justice Kennedy's concurrence also mentioned that the Court's
position would be better suited for a due process analysis. 3 3 He believed
that the Court "would be on strong footing in ruling that a judicial decision
that eliminates or substantially changes established property rights, which
are a legitimate expectation of the owner, is 'arbitrary or irrational' under
the Due Process Clause."1 34 Justice Kennedy further suggested that the Due
Process Clause protects property interests that are secured by "existing rules
or understandings." 35 In his view, the Due Process Clause thus prevents
the judiciary from affecting a taking that would be prohibited by the
Takings Clause if done by the legislature.136 Therefore, in conjunction with
the expressed practical concerns, Justice Kennedy eschewed recognizing
judicial taking in favor of using a substantive due process analysis.
In his opinion, Justice Scalia attempted to refute these various
criticisms of his view of judicial taking.'37 Unlike Justice Kennedy, Justice
Scalia found Justice Breyer's "assuming without deciding" approach to be
inappropriate in this instance. 3 8  In his view, this represented a different
kind of case than the precedent cited by Justice Breyer.'39 Here, unlike in
those circumstances, the constitutional right being established was a "point
of relative detail." 4 0 Moreover, Justice Scalia cited other instances where
the Court had recognized the existence of a constitutional right, had
established a test for the violation of that right, and then had gone on to find
that the claim at issue did not satisfy the newly established test.141 Justice
Scalia chastised Justice Breyer for implicitly accepting a standard by which
130 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2617 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
.3. Id. at 2616-.
132 Id. at 2618.
"' Id. at 2615.
134 id
13s Id.
136 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
13 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2602-08.
3' Id at 2603-04
140 Id. at 2603-04.
1' Id. at 2603-04 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 687, 698-700 (1984); Hill
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-60 (1985); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313-320, 326 (1979)).
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to judge judicial takings in concluding that one does not exist here.142
Justice Scalia also took issue with Justice Kennedy's use of the Due Process
Clause to resolve the issue. Pointing to Albright v. Oliver 43 , Justice Scalia
suggested that the Court had already found that substantive due process
should only be a secondary consideration where a particular constitutional
amendment provides an "explicit textual source of constitutional
protection."'" Moreover, Justice Scalia pointed to the Court's position that
the rights protected by substantive due process do not include economic
liberties.145 He believed that Justice Kennedy's position insinuated a return
to "the Lochner era."l 46 Justice Scalia also mentioned that even if due
process were a suitable alternative to the Takings Clause, it would suffer
from the same practical problems that Justice Kennedy identified
concerning that clause.147
With respect to other practical concerns in the concurrences, Justice
Scalia argued that they were easily solved.148 Regarding remedies, Justice
Scalia believed mandating compensation would be a rare remedy, similar to
legislative or executive takings.149 Instead, the appropriate remedy in his
view was to reverse the lower court's judgment.'50  This too would
highlight the appropriate time to raise the issue of judicial taking. That is, a
party may allege that a judicial taking has occurred in appeal of the lower
court's decision."' Finally, Justice Scalia also addressed Justice Kennedy's
concern that judicial taking may give judges too much discretion.152 In
response, Justice Scalia said that the answer lied in the remedy, which
would not mandate compensation, but instead would require only reversal
of the lower court's decision. ' This, to Justice Scalia, would limit the
enthusiasm of courts to exercise their powers under the Takings Clause.154
Further, Justice Scalia found Justice Kennedy's enthusiasm for using
substantive due process in this area incongruous given the amorphous
application of the doctrine.'s
142 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2603-.
143 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994).
'" Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2606 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 273).
145 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2606.
146 id
147 id
148 Id. at 2607.
149id
150M
15 Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2607.
152 id
154 d
1ss Id. at 2607-08.
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
With Justice Stevens taking no part in the decision of this case, an
eight-member Court was confronted with the difficult issues surrounding an
alleged judicial taking.156 While a majority of the Court reached consensus
regarding Parts I, IV, and V of Justice Scalia's opinion, only four members
of the Court, Justices Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, and Alito, were willing to
recognize the existence of a judicial taking. 157 Justices Breyer, Kennedy,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, on the other hand, refused to recognize such a
taking, finding it unnecessary given the context of the case. 58 While this
posture suggests that the case's holding only stands for the judgment in the
case, it does reflect an increasing willingness by this Court to tackle
Takings Clause issues. Even more interesting is that were the Court to
address this issue again, newly appointed Justice Kagan would likely be a
key vote on the matter.
The fragmented court in Beach Renourishment reflects the complex
and difficult issues that arise when attempting to apply the Takings Clause
to the judicial branch. Courts routinely make decisions impacting property
rights. Because of this, if a majority of the Court were to recognize the
existence of judicial taking, a finely tuned standard would be absolutely
critical to avoid opening the floodgates to new litigation. Justice Scalia's
"established right" standard in Beach Renourishment may be a tenable and
thus persuasive proposition. Largely skirting the dubious issues associated
with an over-inclusive standard, the "established right" standard defangs a
potentially cataclysmic judicial Takings Clause, while pushing a logical and
textual view of the Takings Clause generally. Of course, if this is the future
of judicial taking, then why the heated debate? If a court's decision strips a
party of his or her established property rights, then he or she would merely
be entitled to the same rights as if the action were performed by another
branch of government. The ramifications of this proposed standard are
something less than earth shattering, and may make the judicial taking more
palatable moving forward.
116 Id. at 2597.
17 Id. at 2597.
' Beach Renourishment, 130 S.Ct. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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